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ABSTRACT
This is the first oftwo articles on the dynamics ofthe Jamaican economy over the last two and
a half decades. It comparesthe overall macroeconomy ofJamaica in the areas ofoutput, fiscal
and monetary policy, capital formation and trade to that of Singapore and South Korea. The
conclusion from the aggregate data is that government spending in the second half ofthe 1970’s
and the firsthalf ofthe 1980’s may have had a significant role in the inflationary episodes and
reduced capital formation during this period. The second article will delve deeper into the
details of the fiscal and monetary policies, domestic industrial and social policies and
international relationships in place during this period in order to focus more precisely on the
“micro” causes ofor obstacles to growth.
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The post-Arab oil embargo period has been one of precipitous decline in living
standards forJamaica. In the last two decades, Jamaicahas moved from the forefrontof
developing countries in most measures ofliving standards to jointhe laggards ofthe less
developed countries. A onceenviable middle class has declined considerably. Nations like
Korea and Singapore, which were behind Jamaicain per capita income in the late 1960’s,
haveexploded in growthto become symbols ofindustrialization during the same period. In
the early 1990’s, Jamaicahasreturnedto a positive growthpathandhopefully will recover
from theperiod decline.
Whatwere theroot causes ofthe decline in Jamaica’s economy? Can these causes
be identified and avoided in the future? The finger of blame can be pointed in many
directions - the political regimes are easy targets, impoverishment by oil prices, debt agony,
capital flight, immigrationlbrain drain are all potential factors. What is certain is that the
process is dynamic and has memory. The consequencesofdecisions made in the past are
still beingfelttoday; decisionsmade todaywill have long lasting impact. An analysis ofthe
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1dynamics ofthe macroeconomy is a vital startto determine howto reverse the trend and
innoculate the country againstfuture reversals through appropriate policies and institutions.
This is thefirst oftwo articles assessingthe dynamic path ofgrowth in Jamaicaover
the lasttwo and a halfdecades. This article compares theperformance ofthe economy of
Jamaicato those ofthe AsiancountriesofSouth Korea and Singapore to gaininsights into
correlations between each country’s performance in fundamental areas. It restricts the
analysis to differences in macroeconomic variables among Jamaica and the Newly
IndustrializedEconomies (NIEs) ofSingaporeand Korea and infers from these differences
potential causes ofthe economic decline. The second article will delve intothe underlying
policy regimesand microeconomic distortions which may have influenced these outcomes.
Thenext sectiondiscusses general issues in growthand development. Thefollowing
sections compare the performance of Jamaica, Singapore, and Korea in areas of fiscal
responsibility, investment,financial market stability, and trade. Finally we provide some
comments on key areas formaintaining competitiveness in the global economy.
Growth and Development
The key to sustainable growth is elusive. Consistent themes in the literature on
growththeoryare sound fiscal policy, stable financialmarkets with efficientintermediation
between saversand borrowers, growth inphysical and humancapital stock, relativecontrol
over trade balances, and microeconomic government policies geared toward industrial
development. These fundamentals are both intuitive and compatible with economictheory.
2Increased productivity appears to be causally linked to capital investment in plant and
equipment. Improvements in capital plant and equipment increases laborproductivity and
stimulates per capitaoutput improvement. Although theremay be some controversy about
howwellthese factors stand up to empirical scrutiny, there areprobablyfew economists who
would consider these elements detrimentalto development.
For smalltrade-dependent economies, balance oftradeaccounts also have significant
impact on growth. As a result, these economies tend to focus investment and growth
prospects in the area oftrade. The debate on whetherinvestments should center around
import substitution or increases in export is continuing. Many Pacific Rim, newly
industrialized nations havebeen able to expand both exports and imports and demonstrate
immense output and income growth.’ Investments in these economies have come both
domestically (with some government subsidies) and from foreign direct investmentbymulti-
nationalcorporations. Theviabilityofthese investments are enhanced by a stable financial
sector, including stable exchange rates.
In the quest for sustainable economic growth, economies that are unable to attract
private investment have been forced to international financial institutions, primarily the
Bretton-Woodsorganizations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The IMF’s financial assistance
consists primarily of short-horizon loans to governments that are ostensibly in need of
structural adjustment oftemporary macroeconomic imbalances. These loans come with
conditionalities to reassure the IMF that steps are being takenby therecipients to ensure that
The extentto which favorable bilateral tradeagreements contributed to this growth through increased
markets is not being addressed here.
3the imbalance is being corrected. A typical and often enforced reform is a currency
devaluation for those countries under a fixed exchange rate regime when their currency
appeared to be overvalued againstmajortrading partners. Intheory, the lower value ofthe
domestic currency should boost the exports ofthe debtor nation and, in conjunction with
otherausterity measures, returnthe country to a sustainable growth path. Thereis apaucity
ofempirical verification ofthis theory. Whether ornot the so-called structural adjustments
haveresulted in stimulating real growthis still unanswered. In some instances devaluations
implemented together with trade liberalization resulted in net increases in imports that
exacerbated weakness in the currency.
While long term exchange ratesare still governed by the fundamentals ofpurchasing
powerparity, tariffs and quotas, productivity, and preferences forforeign versus domestic
goods, the short termmovements are affected by perceived changes in the relativerates of
return on asset portfolios denominated in the particular currency. As financial markets
become more globalized, small open economies become more sensitive to international
financial events. When monetary policy uses interest rate targets and credit restrictions,
international portfolios respond by flowing to or from temporary deposits. Small
perturbations in the policies ofindustrialized nationshaveunsettling impacts on international
financial markets. As Mexico foundout, very liquid portfolioswilltake flight rapidly at the
first sign of instability or reduction in the rate ofreturn relative to some perceived risk
premium. When Mexico was forced to devalue in late 1994, the rate ofreturn on assets
denominatedin pesos (relative to dollars) fell and a flight to quality ensued, further reducing
the exchange rateand the expected rate ofreturn.
4Monetary policy becomes vital in attracting both long-term and short-term
investment. Most central bankers who aremotivated to maintain financial market stability
pay close attention to the long-term bond market becausethey reflect the source offixed
investment financing. Ifthere is uncertainty in therate ofreturn on long term investment,
both the suppliersofcredit and potential investors will be deterred. A high risk premium is
demanded for long-term investment in a climate ofpolitical or monetary instability. This
risk premium is reflected in the long-term bond yield. Ineconomies heavily dependent on
trade and foreign investment, exchange rateinstability can havea chillingeffect. Fiscal and
trade imbalancesput pressure on the value ofthe currencyand are not compatible with long-
term growth. Prudent monetary policy is required to maintain the integrity ofthe currency.
What has been Jamaica’s record on fiscal austerity, financial market/exchange rate
stability, and trade management? Ormore specifically, howdoes Jamaica’s record in these
areascompare to two of the so-called tigers ofAsia -South Korea and Singapore?
Sound Fiscal Policy
Sound government fiscal policy is best measured by government budget surplus.
Temporary deficits canbe good forthe economyiftheyreflectinvestment in physicalcapital
orinfrastructure rather than consumption. Recurringdeficits accumulate into a debt burden
which makes interest payments a large part ofthe government’s budget and restricts the
ability to return to fiscal prudence. Total debt ordebt service ratio gives a better indication
ofthe fiscal health ofthe government, reflecting the cumulative deficits incurred in the past.
The proportionofforeigndebt gives evidence oftheexposure ofthefiscalbudgetto external
5pressures on the currency. Debt denominated in foreigncurrency escalates as local currency
is devalued. Sources of revenue that expose inefficient tax collection, and/or excess
dependenceon foreign financial markets also canreveal fiscal instability.
Forthe purposes ofthis article, the line item ofgovernment consumption expressed
asa percent ofGDP is used as a measure offiscal austerity for comparison with Singapore
and South Korea. Figure 1 shows the real GDP per capita in Jamaicafrom 1968 to 1993
compared to the government consumption and capital formation during these years. Figures
2 and 3 show the equivalent datafor Singapore and South Korea, respectively. Per capita
GDP in Jamaicadeclined from 1973 until 1985 by approximately 30%. During the same
period, government consumption increased from about 10% ofGDP in 1969 to a peak of
about20% in 1982. As government consumption declined as a percentage ofGDP, realper
capita income began to increase againbeginning in 1985. Singapore and South Korea, by
comparison, maintain government consumption at about 10% ofGDP.
Increased government consumption in Jamaica between 1974 an 1979 reflect the
briefflirtation with democratic socialism as a responseto increasing income disparity. The
increased government consumption in the early 1980’s reflect an increase in debt,
particularly external debtdenominatedin foreign currency. Detailson these specific causes
will be discussedin thenext article. Figure 4 shows the total external debt and actual annual
repayments in U.S. dollars forthe period 1979 to 1993. The debt is converted to Jamaican
dollars to show the effectofdevaluations. The external debt doubledbetween 1979 and
1981, afterthe change in political administration, from 1.1 billion U.S. dollars in 1979 to
2.3 billion U.S. dollars and peaked at 4.7 billion U.S. by 1987. Annual repayments jumped
6from 200 million U.S. dollarsperyear to a peakofalmost 750 millionU.S. dollars, putting
an equivalent strain on foreign reserves. Ensuing weakness in the curency contributed to
devaluations which increased the debt in terms of local currency, from about $2 billion
Jamaican dollars in 1979 whenthe exchange ratewas 1.78 per US dollar, to $142 billion
Jamaican in 1993 at an exchange rate of32.48 per US dollar.
Economic theorymaintainsthat excess government spending will resultin crowding
out ofprivate investment. Thepresence ofthegovernment in credit marketsraises the cost
ofcapital and detersprivate investment. Lower private investment reducesthe growth of
the capital stock ofthe country, lowering the growth ofcapital to laborratio and, therefore,
labor productivity. Could this have occurredin Jamaica? The datasuggest that government
consumption asa percent ofGDP in Jamaicais excessive compared to Singapore and South
Korea. Thenext sectionlooks atthemovementofcapitalformation over theperiodwithout
inferring causality.
Capital Formation
Both intuitively and theoretically we can make the connection between increased
physical capital, improved productivity, and increased standard of living. Has private
investment been less than ideal in Jamaica over the last two decades? There are no easy
measures ofcapital flight (human or physical), but we can measure actual growth in the
capital stock through measures ofcapital formation. From figure 1 we also see the Gross
Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) asa percent ofGDP compared to per capitareal GDP. As
7a measureofprivate sectorinvestment, GFCF fell from approximately30% ofGDP in 1969
to low ofabout 12% in 1977. With an incipient lagofabout three years, wesee per capita
GDP tracking the reduction in GFCF; declining beginning in 1974 and leveling offby 1980.
As GFCF recovered to over 25% ofGDP by 1990per capita GDP appears to be headedback
to steady growth. The implication is that the reduction in investment in new capital leads
to reduced growth as the physicalplant depreciates and the economy loses the efficiency
gains from newtechnology. By comparisonSingapore and South Korea’s experience shown
in Figures 2 and 3 reflecta trendrise in GFCF from a low ofabout 20%ofGDP in 1972 to
over 35% ofGDP in 1992. IfJamaicacan strive for and maintain capital additions at this
30%to 35% ofGDP, and maintain government consumption atthe 10% level, the return to
growthmay be sustainable.
Part ofthe explanation ofthe GFCF movement in Jamaica lies in the pattern of
investment in the bauxite industry, which was very heavy in the late sixties and early
seventies but dried up afterthat. Thesourcesofthe increased GFCF during the 1980’s need
to be identified. The next article will explorethe sectoral investment patterns during the
period in more detail. The next sectionlooks at indicators ofthe level offinancialmarket
stabilityover thetime period.
8Stable Financial Markets
Iffixed investment is the engine ofgrowth, then savings is thefuel and a stable
financialsector is the lubricant ofthe engine.
Keynes suggests that “animal spirits” move investors, while classical theory
maintainsthat investmentreflects theequilibrium ofsavings and investmentat the marginal
productivity of capital. Ifmarginal productivity of capital drives investment, then it is
paradoxicalthat, given the expected greater marginal productivityofcapital in developing
countries like Jamaica, and the international mobility of capital, investment flows from
developed countries to lesser developed countries is so limited (Lucas, AER May 1990).
The reasons forreduced capital flows are probably many,but one easy explanation ofthis
paradox is stability in financial markets.
A major motivation for investors is expectation of profits. Unstable financial
markets (as well as political instability) threatens the realization of profits. A natural
asymmetry ofinformation exists betweenproviders ofcapital and entrepreneurs. Anything
which reduces the impactofthis asymmetry is good, anything which addsto the uncertainty
is bad. Uncertainty in the financial markets, whether due to inflation, foreign exchange
instability, or general political instability, is reflected in higher cost ofcapital and lower
investment levels.
Two highly correlated indicators of financial market instability are domestic
inflation and exchange rate instability. As Mexico found out, fixed exchange rates have
proven futile in the presence of persistent fiscal and trade imbalance, high foreign-
denominateddebtservicingand liberalizedcapitalmarkets. Rampant inflation is sometimes
9a manifestation of government deficits financed by increasing money supply. Currency
devaluations also canbe precipitated by government debtservicingpressures combined with
increasing domestic demand forimports. For this article, the exchange rate and consumer
price index will be usedto compare the financial market stabilityofthe three countriesbut
the causes ofinflationary spirals ordevaluations arenot being inferred.
Figure 5 shows the domestic currencyper US$ forJamaicaand Figures 6 and 7 for
Singapore and South Korea over the 1968-1994 period. Singapore data reflect a steady
appreciation ofthe Singapore dollarto the US$, whereas South Korea shows fluctuations
which maybe more tied to fundamentals suchas trade flow.
Figure 8 shows the consumer price index (CPI) compared to the money stock in
Jamaica. There has been an over 400% increase in the price level since the base year of
1990. The strong correlationbetweenthemoney stock and the CPI is obvious. An investor
in nominal securities would have to be guaranteed in excessof 100% per year return before
consideringlong term investment denominated in Jamaican currency. By contrast, figure
8 shows a much more stable price level for Singapore and Korea.
Milton Friedman asserts that inflation is always and everywhere a monetary
phenomenon, meaning that inflation is fueled primarily by growth in the money supply.
Even those economists who disagree with himon issues ofpolicy are aptto agree with the
quantity theory ofmoney and that, over the long run, a monetary authority that allows the
money supply to grow faster thanthe growthofgoods and services contributes to increases
in prices. In some instances, this growthin themoney supply canbe a deliberate (orat least
tacit) use ofthe central bank to monetize government deficit expenditure. Most industrial
10countries, -- and especiallyGermany which has had two periods ofhyperinflation in their
memory --, establish a central bank that is independent ofthe government, to remove the
temptation to useinflationary policies as an alternative to direct tax revenues. This is not
the case in Jamaicaand many less developed countries. An independentmonetary authority
is one method ofensuring that theintegrityofthe currency is maintained. The central bank
is also a primary watch dog institution for financial entities, ensuring that banks maintain
appropriateasset/liability ratios to coverthe risk ofinsolvency and liquidity crises. Other
deposit insurance institutions and regulatory bodies outsidethe central bank can also be
established to maintain financialmarket integrity.
Trade Balance
At the base ofmany ofthe NIE’s growth has been a trade-focussed development
programofindustrialization, a so-called outward looking economy. The limited ability for
isolated growth suggests that countries with limited resources look to the increasing world
market for growth in income. Although Japan stands out as a counter-example, island
economies like Jamaicahave limited resources and, must plan within narrow confines.
Development specialists argue whether import substitution or exports should be the focus
ofindustrialization. Park (1992) suggeststhat South Korea began with import substitution
and gainedthe growthin humancapitalnecessaryto become competitiveon theinternational
market for goods traditionally dominated by more industrialized nations. Singapore, on the
other hand, focussedon opening its economyto foreign direct investment (FDI). HongKong
chose a path that evolved from a simple “Trading Post” history. Revenues stemmed
11primarilyfrom business activities. Therefore, to the extent that these couldbe encouraged,
growth could be assured. This does not imply that every country should risk their
sovereignty by opening ownership ofnational resources to all. It can be argued that any
trade related development processmust be custom-tailored to the individual country. It is
clear, however, that an increasingtrade deficitofmajorproportion to GDP is not consistent
with growth. Increasingexports lend positively to GDP growth.
It might seem inappropriate to compare a country like South Korea with over 40
millionpeople with Jamaica, a small island of2.5 millionpeople, except that prior to 1970,
Jamaicahad a higher standard ofliving than either ofthesetwo nations. It is also useful to
know what the differences have been both from a policy standpoint and from a trade
environment standpoint.
Oneinstructive comparisonis in thetrade deficitmaintained with the United States.
Jamaicahas maintained atrade deficitwith the US throughoutthe periodin question. Figure
10 shows the net exports with the U.S. forJamaicafrom 1968 to 1994. By comparison, the
net exports with the U.S. forSingapore and South Korea are shown in Figures 11 and 12.
The tradesurplus by both South Korea and Singapore is obvious from the graphs. Although
both South Koreaand Singapore showperiodsoftradedeficits, theseperiods do notcompare
to the “occasional” surplusyear forJamaica. Isthis trade balance a reflectionofpreferential
tradetreatment ofgoods imported into theUS from Singapore and Korea?
The Reagan administration established a tradeagreement knownas the Caribbean
Basin Initiative (CBI) in the mid-1980’s. The agreement established reduced tariffs on
certain commodities that meet specific rules of origin criteria. The CBI resulted in a
12significant increase in exports from the Caribbean (including Jamaica) to the U.S.
Simultaneously, however, imports from the U.S. increased dramatically, resulting in a net
increase in Jamaica’s trade deficit with the U.S. The composition of imports is a better
indicator ofthe long-term impactoftradedeficits. Ifcapital goods arethefocus ofincreased
imports, this suggests a future strengthening the economy. A more detailedanalysis ofthe
datain thenext article will provide answers.
The simple comparison is that Singapore and South Korea maintained better trade
balances and achieved higher growth. As the data shows, Singapore and South Korea
maintained a trade surplus with the US during most ofthe 1980’s and early 1990’s. By
contrast, even with the CBI, Jamaica’s trade deficit with the US has climbed dramatically
since the eighties. This deficit growthand subsequent devaluationofthecurrencycoincides
with theremoval ofimport tariffs and quotas by the JamaicaLabour Party regime in 1980.
As the pressure of demand for imports increased during the 1980’s, the demand for US
dollars put increasing pressure on the Jamaican dollar. This pressure, combined with
domestic inflationpossibly fueledby fiscalirresponsibility, forceddevaluation. Onthe other
hand, thepromised boon to exports from devaluationdid not seemto materialize. Infact,
closerobservationofthe data suggeststhat prior to the last major devaluation,importshad
begun to fall offsignificantly.
Figure 13 compares Jamaica’s per capita GDP with GDP minus net exports. This
gives an indication of the contribution of the trade deficit/surplus to GDP growth.2
2 This is an unorthodox comparison since some gains from trade are not offsetting.
However, in astrict accounting sense, atrade deficit is adrag on GDP and whentradedwarfs the
domestic economy it is difficultto ignore.
13Throughout the period, the trade deficit was a drag on GDP and in the early 1980’s, per
capita GDP remainedflat insteadofrising becauseofthe rising trade deficit. Singapore and
South Korea by contrast had trade surpluses, which increased their respective per capita
GDP.
What doesit all mean?
Comparing Jamaica with South Korea and Singapore statistically shows that the
Jamaican economyhasyetto recoverto its pre-embargo levels ofper capita output. It also
suggests a future rational path. Despite all the controversy surroundinggrowththeory, most
campswill agree that
o Increasing capital increases laborproductivity,
o Monetization ofdebtleadsto inflation,
o Inflation destabilizes financial markets,
o Unstable financial markets increase the cost ofcapital and deters investment,
o Trade surpluses contribute positively to GDP (tautology).
A comparison of Jamaica with these two NIEs shows that Jamaica has fallen behind in
capitalformation, controllinginflation, and managing government consumption. The high
cost ofcapital which grows out ofinflation and the crowding outofprivate investment by
government is evident in the Jamaicaneconomy. It also showsthat an increasing, consistent
14trade deficit has been the Jamaican profile, whereas South Korea and Singapore have
maintained surpluses during the expansionperiod.
This scenario is probably typical for many so-called Third World nations. The
reasonsforthis dismal state ofaffairs areprobably unique and yet overlapping in core for
eachcountry. Whatis not clear is whetherthe so-called success stories in east Asiareflect
entirely endogenous growthfrom the proper policies orexogenous (political) shocks. For
example, is a liberal market economy the source of success of South Korea as much as
preferential trade treatment, which provided ready access to a major market? Did
Singapore’s stable financial market occur as a policy action or did FDI in export
commodities provide sufficient foreign currency to stabilize financial markets? Even if
growthin these countriesare aresult ofpolitical preferential treatment, howdoes a country
negotiate such preferential treatment in the post-cold war/post-Uruguay Round era?
Strategic locations allow Egypt and Israel access to foreign aid grants, which need not be
repaid. Much poorer nations with little or no strategic importance are saddled with debt
many times their GNP, which must be repaid out ofscant export earnings. Someofthese
countries thathavehad preferential tradetreatment in thepast havelost that extraedge. Will
theirperformance drop accordingly? Will the enforcementofGATT rules level the playing
field, or remove a past source of competitive edge, (e.g. intellectual property rights
enforcement in Pacific Rimnations)? Trade liberalization still will be a political football.
Countries with powerwill still be able to stroke their allies and strangle their enemies; and
those to whom they are indifferentmust lobby. One thing is evident and that is that poor
nationswill no longer be able to depend on the international financial institutions to provide
15investment directlyto governments. The future must be to attractprivate investment in plant
equipment, whether service or industry based. Unless a substantial middle class can be
generated overnight, domestic savings will be insufficientto providethe investmentneeded
for growth, so for the near future, capital must come from international sources. With
increased foreign capital, developing nations must scrutinize their balancesheets to ensure
that net repatriated returns to capital do not exceed the benefits ofincome growth through
domestic factor input returns.
How DoCapital-Poor Countries Attract Foreign Investors?
The puzzle oflimited (private) capital flows from developed to less developed
countries still remains, given the huge potential for marginal productivity increases from
capital. Any measure of industrialization will indicate that these nations are under-
capitalized and the potential returns are much more than industrialized nations can hope to
gain. Instability is one explanation as discussed above. The rational response to this
instability is a risk premium. But some studies have shown that evenwith risk premiums,
there is a certain irrationalityto the way financial markets ignore less developed countries.
Information flowalso hasbeen cited as a potential deterrentto foreign investment. Inthe
mid-90’s “emerging markets” caughtthe interestofportfolio investors but suffered from the
“TequilaEffect” when the suddencollapse ofthe Mexican peso left many investors with
losses and leery of developing economies. Some analysts blame the slow flow of
information forthe crisis of confidence in Mexico in early 1995. More transparency in
financialmarketsthrough improvedinformation gathering andcommunicationwillengender
16confidence in international investment. Political stability has always been ofconcern to
foreign investment. Although Jamaica does not have a history of political instability,
assurances ofproperty rights and international rule oflaw within a democratic framework
reflects a stable climate that will open doors for capital inflows by private investors and
reduce the dependency on international financial agencies.
Domesticinvestment is preferable to FDI. But withouta large enough middle class
with sufficient disposable income to boost domestic saving, the international savings must
be the source of investment for developing countries. FDI is preferable to government
borrowing. Government borrowing places a tax burden on future generations unless
micromanagement usesforeignborrowings as loans denominatedinthe appropriatecurrency
for private investment opportunity. The new South Africa has astutely avoided the
international financialagencies. Instead, South Africahasadvertised heavilyin international
publications to encourage foreign investment in domestic industries. In addition, the
government has successfully gone to the international bond market with a major offering in
1994. After the initial warm reception, the international bond markets have not been one
hundred percent favorable to the second South African issue. Nonetheless furtherissues are
in the works. Of course this latter option which removes the burden of restrictions
associated with international financial agencies may not be available to most developing
countries, butthe small island nation ofMauritiushas recently entered theinternational bond
market and with its excellent economic growthover the past decade should fare well. A
comprehensive plan of marketing and a decisive effort to increase information flow in
17conjunction with property rights guarantees to foreign investors will go a long way to
attracting capital to developing countries.
The Current Outlook For Jamaica
The present administration is striving to keep Jamaica on a firm growth path.
Advances in the equity market shows that financial markets are being opened. Fiscal
responsibility appears to be the mode. The central bank, although still under the guidance
ofthe Ministry ofFinance, appears to be more cognizant ofthe impact offinancialmarket
stability on the economy over the long run. Inflation has beencurtailed sharply - downto
1% increase in May 1995 with the prospect of falling to single digits by 1996. If this
stability canbe sustained, thenthe prospectforsustainable growthis encouraging. Inrecent
months failures ofsome commercial banks due to liquidity crises have forced the central
bank to intervene. It appears that these interventions have beensuccessful in shoring up the
financialsector. The currentFinanceMinister, Dr. Omar Davies, is providingan atmosphere
that engenders internatinal confidence. Trade negotiations, both regional and bilateral, are
setting the stagefor future growth.
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___________________________ 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
— Disbursed Debt (Millions US$) 1132.00 1357.00 2299.30 2842.40 3313.50 3566.00 4068.10 4187.20 4696.30 4532.50 4536.30 4628.10 4480.30 4303.60 4374.00
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1* Computed using endof year exchange rate
Source: IADB Economicand Social Progress in Latin America (various years)Figure 5
Jamaica’s Monthly Average Exchange Rate
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Singapore’s Monthly Average Exchange Rate
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South Korea’s Monthly Average Exchange Rate
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Consumer Price Index for South Korea and Singapore
Korea’s CPI
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